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Abstract 
 
Economists in the public are accused of propagating highly professional, but unrealistic theo-
ries that mislead market agents and policy makers to place too much confidence in rational 
behaviour and market equilibrium. The paper analyses to what extent the US banking crisis 
and the euro crisis can be ascribed to fallacious assessments and recommendations on the part 
of economic theory. In the first case, myopic financial market theory and practice had ne-
glected systemic repercussions of micro bank trading patterns. The euro crisis emerged from 
the neglect of undergraduate economic wisdom of necessary adjustment mechanisms in a cur-
rency union. Economists hopefully misinterpreted current account deficits as a sign of struc-
tural change.  
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1. Introduction 
 
People rarely speak about economic science when sales and employment are on a steady 
course, and share prices are on the way up. But as a competitive order necessarily comprises 
disappointments and economic losses, a perceived economic crisis is almost an everyday im-
pression. This holds true all the more since 2008 when the Lehman default triggered a series 
of banking and debt crises. It is also a common saying that economics as a science is not very 
helpful in protecting society against crises or, at least, their consequences for individual life. 
People deplore that economists are unable to predict share price crashes, bank defaults or a 
sudden rise of unemployment. In recent years, an even stronger accusation is heard: that eco-
nomic theory beliefs and recommendations might even have caused the crises, e.g. by tempt-
ing market agents to risky behaviour, which in turn provokes a series of suggestions on how 
to reform the scientific practice of economics.  
 If we want to do justice to economics we first endeavour to disentangle the current vari-
ous crisis elements and make a clear distinction between the US banking crisis and the ongo-
ing problems within the eurozone. Also one cannot judge of the guiltiness of economists if the 
causes of the breakdown of market mechanisms are not elucidated. Therefore, after a look on 
the Great Depression of the 1930s that also conveyed the message of a failure of economics 
and even initiated a scientific revolution, we briefly give a short explanation of both the Sub-
prime and the euro crisis in Section 2.  
 The Lehman default sometimes is presented as a market failure similar to the 2001 stock 
market crash. Section 3 however argues that the popular debate on market efficiency (ampli-
fied by the 2013 Nobel Prize decision) does not capture the troubles in the US banking sys-
tem. Section 4 confirms that modern macroeconomic theory in fact starts with an "ideal" fi-
nancial market unsuited to understand recent turmoil; but this had hardly any effect on bank-
ing practices. It is shown in Section 5 that besides politicians, also economists are to blame 
for the eurozone calamities because of their severe misjudgements of economic heterogeneity 
within Europe. Section 6 finally argues that an unrestricted banking business was a common 
factor of both the Subprime and the euro crisis.  
 
2. Historical and contemporary systemic crises  
 
American and European crises after 2008 mainly are perceived as debt crises, contrary to the 
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Great Depression of the 1930s, which is associated with large unemployment and its disas-
trous political consequences. This different impression however rests on divergent responses 
to sudden wealth losses in the sphere of financial markets. Crashing share prices in 1929 that 
had been driven by unsound credit supply entailed a systemic crisis of the banking sector; the 
latter could not be countered by central banks, given the constraints of the gold standard. As-
sets and debts evaporated, output and employment losses destabilised markets and societies. 
Nowadays politicians aim to prevent bankruptcies of banks and governments by applying 
various rescue programs, but these emergency credits enlarge the already high stock of debts 
and the distribution of write-down losses remain an open issue.1  
 Should we blame economic theory for the emergence of the Great Depression of the 
1930s? The gold standard had not been invented by theorists, but developed from the practice 
of international banking. Moreover, its unwritten set of rules allowed for temporary suspen-
sion of bank note convertibility, if the also unwritten condition was met that convertibility 
would be resumed later at an unchanged nominal parity.2 Thus American central bankers 
would have been able to rescue stumbling commercial banks, but they did not want to dis-
pense with the traditional competitive principle of Laissez Faire also in the banking sector. 
Their British colleagues showed more flexibility when they opted for leaving the gold stan-
dard in 1931, but were surprised that a punishment failed to materialise.3  
 Hesitant behaviour of central banks hardly proves any guiltiness of contemporary eco-
nomic theory. Bagehot's (1873) recommendation with regard to liquidity policy was common 
knowledge since decades. The widely debated fallacy of neoclassical macro theory − extend-
ing employment promoting effects of nominal wage cuts from microeconomic analysis to the 
macro view − is another matter. This might have contributed to fallacious decisions in the 
field of wage and fiscal policy.4 With the benefit of hindsight one might appease attacks on 
traditional economic science by arguing that a distinct and coherent macroeconomic theory, 
which ought to elucidate the relationships between asset, goods and labour markets, did not 
yet exist in the early 1930s. The writings of Wicksell who offered important contributions 
                                                 
1 For a comparison of both these large crises see e.g. Ritschl (2012). 
2 This "Restoration Rule" contributed to the stabilisation of exchange rate expectations and pre-
vented the emergence of hot money (Bordo/James 2013).  
3 A member of the British aristocracy was baffled: "Nobody told us we could do this" (Artis/Lewis 
1993: 50; cf. Spahn 2001: 121-5). 
4 However Brüning's austerity policy also was motivated by foreign policy reasons (Borchardt 
1979).  
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were hardy adopted beyond Sweden. Schumpeter's theory of development rested on a concept 
of competition and thus was basically built on microeconomic views. It was Keynes who fi-
nally delivered a macroeconomic framework for the analysis of demand, production and in-
come. Hence, many doctrines and recommendations were drawn as conclusions by analogy 
from microeconomic reasoning. Economics as a science thus offered wrong, and not firmly 
based advice for policymakers. Its guiltiness consisted in its poor state of awareness.  
The American banking crisis and the euro crisis broke out in quick succession, and thus 
often are conceived as one complex event: a persistently lingering, and at times active finan-
cial market crisis. This view might have its origin in a widely shared mistrust, and partly also 
in a lack of understanding, of the "inscrutable" behaviour of the banking system. Maybe there 
is some truth in the hypothesis of a single cause of both crises5, but firstly their basic differ-
ences should be emphasised:  
 (1) The world financial crisis ensuing from the downfall of Lehman resulted from an 
"everyday" case of a real-estate credit supply wave that was only insufficiently collateralised. 
The systemic aspect of this crisis evolved in an unpredicted, but not unforeseeable, way from 
the financial innovation of pooling and selling these credit claims as marketable securities, 
accompanied by the attempt to cover the risks of these assets by purchasing insurance from 
financial institutions. This new banking strategy of dealing with credit-claim balance sheet 
items was denoted as the changeover from originate-and-hold to originate-and-distribute. 
However, a systemic disaster would never had occurred if banks, following the principle 
of spreading the risks of property loans, really had sold these asset-backed securities in small 
portions to world savers. Each of these agents would have suffered a minor loss of her net 
wealth (and backed off from buying such assets in the future). Even if goods demand would 
have been lowered as a reaction to wealth losses, monetary policy could have provided stabi-
lisation. But in fact the bulk of these securities was acquired by highly indebted financial in-
stitutions whose weak capital resources were quickly wiped out by falling asset prices. Mar-
ket uncertainty about the true value of asset-backed securities and the distribution of neces-
sary write-offs in the banks' balance sheets rapidly destroyed the creditworthiness of many fi-
nancial institutions, cutting them off from the refinancing market. Outsized maturity trans-
formation compelled a fire sale of assets in order to regain liquidity, whereby asset prices fur-
ther fell. Obtaining insurance from other financial agents of the same market segment of the 
                                                 
5 See the final section of the paper. 
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economy turned out to be an illusion (Brunnermeier 2009; Franke/Krahnen 2009; Hellwig 
2009).   
 (2) The euro crisis finds its roots in granting countries with differing politico-economic 
capabilities the access to a common financial market. In some of the weaker economies, a 
strong demand for resources and the abolition of the balance of payment constraint thus led to 
a non-sustainable boom. There were hopes for a solid catching-up, but consumptive and less 
efficient uses of borrowed means were dominant. The loss of competitiveness showed in ris-
ing current account deficits.  
 The collapse, triggered but not caused by the fall of Lehman, left "southern" eurozone 
countries with huge write-off needs in their banks' balance sheets, a rising fiscal burden due to 
programs supporting macroeconomic activity and the faltering banks, and balance of payment 
deficits as capital imports dwindled. Whereas the latter (the famous TARGET2 balances) 
were financed via national money creation, public bonds of some countries after 2010 lost 
their marketability. As governments no longer were able to rely on the Lender of Last Resort 
services of national central banks, bond prices only depend on − possibly − shaken private ex-
pectations on future governments' solvency. The problem of reinforcing and interrelated in-
debtedness of governments and banks finally could only be "solved" by resorting to monetary 
policy announcements and operations that clearly implied a violation of the spirit of the 
Maastricht Treaty (De Grauwe 2011; Buiter/Rahbari 2012; Whelan 2013).  
 
3. Does the Subprime Crisis refute the Efficient Market Hypothesis? 
 
For many observers, a clear responsibility of economic science for the US financial crisis can 
easily be proved: the Efficient Market Hypothesis postulates (following gradually different 
versions) that asset prices show "fundamental" values as they always represent the current 
state of information; the corresponding Black-Scholes Formula provides a "fair" valuation of 
options and derivatives. All this builds on the assumption of an optimising behaviour of 
agents who reach their decisions by using rational expectations. Financial markets thus tend 
to produce a state of equilibrium that mirrors the constitution of the "real economy". There is 
no scope for speculative bubbles; therefore financial market agents should be exempt from 
unnecessary regulations so that perfect markets raise the welfare of nations.  
The outbreak of the crisis now appears to prove on the contrary that markets tend to pro-
duce chaotic boom-and-bust cycles and that the hope for stable equilibria is ill-founded and 
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even dangerous. Strict provisions are to be made ruling out that imprudent private market de-
cisions entail large economic and social costs. Maybe the homo economicus approach should 
be reassessed; the integration of adjacent social science views might help to prevent that mar-
ket agents and politicians are led astray by a straitened vision of formal, too math-oriented 
economic theory.  
The above simplified sketch of diagnosis and therapy most probably captures a widely 
shared view in the public. What is wrong with it? Sometimes things become more fuzzy if 
they are contemplated more closely. Firstly, efficient markets and rational expectations do not 
rule out persistent price movements that resemble a bubble. New information might let prices 
find their new equilibrium positions − but this hypothesis is silent on the question whether 
new information reaches all agents at the same time. Even if new data are available for eve-
ryone at once, understanding and interpretation of these data, i.e. the translation into informa-
tion, necessarily is a time-consuming process in a competitive market system.6 An emerging 
convergence of opinions yields the image of a continuous change of prices that differs from 
the initially expected random walk pattern. Also some overshooting might occur if apparent 
learning turns out as a mispricing.  
 Purists might object that rational expectations mean an immediate understanding of new 
data. With respect to asset markets this would imply perfect foresight. This in turn contradicts 
the self-conception of the rational expectations approach; it says that individuals make use of 
all information sources by taking into account costs and benefits, but does not state that indi-
viduals can foresee the future. 
 A second, and even more important point is that the Efficient Market Hypothesis basi-
cally refers to price formation on stock markets, e.g. for shares, but not to the risky business 
of extending bank loans. The bursting New Economy bubble in 2001 probably represents an 
appropriate case study for testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis, but this crash did not pro-
voke a systemic crisis whereas the smaller first-round losses of the Subprime Crisis posed a 
                                                 
6 "The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by 
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concen-
trated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not 
merely a problem of how to allocate 'given' resources − if 'given' is taken to mean given to a single 
mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these 'data'. It is rather a problem of how to secure 
the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance 
only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not 
given to anyone in its totality" (Hayek 1945: 519-20; cf. Arrow 1978). 
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dramatic threat for the world banking system.  
 The Subprime Crisis hints to problems within the structure of the banking industry: busi-
ness practice, transaction patterns and financial instruments show a severe exposure to sys-
temic risk. Even if the bursting of the real estate bubble was predicted by some observers, the 
breakdown of the interbank market was not (Kirchgässner 2009). The issue is not whether as-
set markets are characterised by fundamental or speculative prices − this marks the debate be-
tween the two Nobel Prize winners of 2013, Fama and Shiller − but whether financial market 
contracts involve large counterparty risk that might, via chain reactions, destabilise the macro 
system. The Efficient Market Hypothesis e.g. is silent on the optimal extent of maturity trans-
formation; moreover, a perfect financial market would not need banks as agents manage to fi-
nance all transactions by direct, if necessary contingent, contracts. The existence of banks 
hints to "frictions", i.e. deviations from perfect markets that might originate in e.g. asymmet-
ric information; bringing in financial intermediaries then is a welfare enhancing step.7  
 The precarious stability of commercial banks is a well known topic since some centuries. 
The evolutionary search for provisions against bank defaults depends on social and political 
circumstances. Hence the deregulation euphoria in economic policy since the 1980s that re-
lied on the renewed belief in innovative self-regulating forces of competition also was one of 
the origins of the financial crisis. A policy of mitigating rules and restrictions for behaviour 
on goods and labour markets spilled over to the banking sector and paved the way for new 
business models and financial instruments. This was admitted by policymakers, not least be-
cause of a preceding apparent success of economic science (Tichy 2010). The Great Modera-
tion since the 1990s denotes a period of − compared to the two decades before − lower volati-
lity of output and employment and lower inflation. This outcome was widely interpreted as 
flowing from a better understanding of macroeconomic market mechanisms and from a more 
professional monetary policy. Thus future stability seemed to be granted, and any occurring 
risk was expected to be manageable.8  
 Given these conditions, reflections towards a risk-taking channel convincingly show that 
credit supply of financial intermediaries is increasing along with risk-adjusted expected yields 
(Borio/Lowe 2002; Adrian/Shin 2010). The argument of excessive profit targets and expecta-
                                                 
7 The slow process of acknowledging the key role of banking in macroeconomics is presented by 
Gertler (1988). Structural changes within the business of bank intermediation is depicted by Adrian/ 
Shin (2010).    
8 A similar optimism prevailed in the 1960s after the invention of Keynesian demand management.  
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tions, which then propels "irrational" share price movements, may be relevant for a critical 
assessment of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, but does not help to understand the Subprime 
Crisis. Here the key driver was expected profit from financial intermediation. It is true that 
the new strategy of selling credit claims promised a large advantage with respect to liquidity 
and capital management, but still financial intermediation is nourished by the interest spread 
between the acquisition of liquidity and the rate of return of assets held against the non-bank 
sector. Subprime lending only accelerated after 2004 when the spread narrowed due to the 
switch to a more restrictive policy stance on part of the Fed and banks tried to defend profits 
by resorting low-quality lending.9  
It is evident that systemic risk of financial innovations had been underrated; formally 
elaborated models of risk analysis did not grasp the structural change that accompanied the 
changeover to the new bank business. Financial market agents lost track of the value of self-
created payment claims. They experienced heavy losses, often implying bankruptcy, thus 
proving that they were not able to survive in the competitive system. Admittedly it appears as 
a clever business strategy, that in many cases society took over losses whereas managers got 
away with bonuses. But this procedure is not suited as an intended general market strategy 
because the kind and extension of public rescue operations remain imponderable, and effec-
tive damage claims cannot be ruled out.  
Finally there is the supposed puzzle that the vast number of ABS and CDOs, which con-
tained only a small part of non-performing loans, during the financial crisis were not traded at 
their fundamental, but at much lower prices. This question again affects the core of the Effi-
cient Market Hypothesis. The answer does not require behaviouristic research, but only a look 
at simple economic facts:  
A first explanation can be found by taking into account the low transparency of the effec-
tive distribution of losses assigned to single tranches of structured securities, and its distribu-
tion among financial market firms. "The riskier mortgages in mortgage-backed securities had 
been intermingled like salmonella-tainted frosting among a very small batch of cakes that 
have been randomly mixed with all the other cakes in the factory and then shipped to bakeries 
throughout the country" (Lo 2012: 157). The shock event of falling real estate prices also 
                                                 
9 "Whereas one usually thinks of investment excesses as being the result of irrational exuberance, 
i.e., excessive optimism, one should appreciate that fear can be just as powerful. If the long-term inter-
est rate stands between 4 to 5% and you refinance yourself at rates between 3 or 4% there isn't much 
of a margin on which to cover your costs and earn a return on equity" (Hellwig 2009: 164).  
8 
 
made market agents promptly become more cautious when assessing the value of securitised 
credit claims.10 Banks with strong liquidity acted rationally, protecting their own wealth sta-
tus, when they denied any further interbank loans to weaker institutes.  
A second explanation is related to temporary liquidity shortages that exclude notional 
buyers and cause price cuts. Therefore market behaviour does not deliver a probative objec-
tion against the Efficient Market Hypothesis.11 However, liquidity and default risks surely 
were somewhat unappreciated in the traditional approach, which analysed partial market rela-
tionships and neglected systemic aspects. Efficient markets do not avert default of agents, on 
the contrary: this threat is a condition for maintaining efficiency. Social follow-up costs nev-
ertheless show that external effects of competitive failures were inadequately privatised; 
maybe they can never by fully privatised. Hence the Subprime Crisis represents the "Fuku-
shima" of financial market theory.  
 
4. Financial markets and scientific progress in macro theory  
 
Economics today is confronted with the reproach that not much attention was paid to financial 
markets in macroeconomic theory; the rise of financial risks therefore went unnoticed. How-
ever former schools of macroeconomic thought − starting from the IS-LM approach, proceed-
ing to monetarism, and extending to New Classical and Real Business Cycle models − treated 
the banking sector even more shabby then New Keynesian theory that dominates the scene 
since the 1990s. Here financial markets have a key role to play.  
 New Keynesian theory postulates the overcoming of the separation of micro and macro 
theory that emanated from the Keynesian Revolution. Overall economic relations between in-
                                                 
10 "In the case of credit derivatives, a small increase in the probability of mortgage default could 
lead to some investors being induced to check [their basic value]. This in turn will lead others to check 
and the whole system will switch from an equilibrium where nobody checks the underlying value of 
assets to one where everyone does so. When this happens, the price of such derivatives drops dramati-
cally, making many market participants vulnerable and others unwilling to lend to them" (Kirman 
2010: 524).  
11 "The notion that the market values of securities may be significantly below the expected present 
values of future cash flows from these securities seems incompatible with the theory of asset pricing in 
informationally efficient markets. However, the contradiction is apparent rather than real. Any notion 
that asset prices should correspond to expected present values of future cash flows presumes (i) that 
the parties holding these expectations have sufficient funds to bet on their expectations by taking long 
positions and (ii) that little attention needs to be paid to risk premia and liquidity premia" (Hellwig 
2009: 174).  
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vestment, consumption, output and employment are to be derived from an intertemporal deci-
sion calculus of utility maximising individuals. A somewhat irritating implication is that a 
distinct macro theory that can deliver different perspectives, compared to an individualistic 
approach, is rendered superfluous. Keynes's message according to which an understanding of 
market mechanisms on a national and global level cannot be derived from an aggregation of 
microeconomic results thus is rejected.12  
 The basic principle of New Keynesian theory typically is presented by reference to a 
"representative agent" who chooses − given his utility function − an optimal path of work, lei-
sure, consumption and investment, whereby shocks emanating from the surrounding econo-
mic nature trigger adjustment activities. This is a kind of a Robinson Crusoe economy where 
micro and macro perspectives are identical by construction.13 If households with differing 
times preferences are introduced they write contracts on perfect financial markets that enable 
each individual to realise an optimal distribution of consumption over time; given income ex-
pectations, shocks and interest rate impulses, households save or dissave, i.e. act as creditors 
or debtors. Key assumption is that all agents establish optimal plans by taking into account 
their budget constraint so that, if shocks remain below some threshold, defaults never occur. 
Thus in principle, promises to service debts are kept.14 All agents are perfectly creditworthy 
and do not suffer from liquidity shortages; each individual's permanent income is accepted as 
collateral as variations of employment proceed along the labour supply function; involuntary 
unemployment thus is precluded.  
                                                 
12 For a critical survey on New Keynesian macro theory see Blanchard (2008) and Spahn (2009).  
13 The analytical justification of introducing a representative agent as a kind of deputy of numerous 
heterogeneous individuals is much disputed. Early debates in General Equilibrium theory in the 1960s 
and 1970s came to the conclusion that individual preferences cannot be aggregated without contradic-
tion. But some opinion leaders of the scientific community used their influence in order to suppress 
these objections. "The historical emergence of the representative agent paradigm is a mystery. [...] The 
representative agent appeared without methodological discussion. In the words of Deirdre McCloskey: 
'It became a rule in the conversation of some economists because Tom [Sargent] and Bob [Lucas] said 
so' [...]. Today, this convention has become so strong that many young economists wouldn't know of 
an alternative way to approach macroeconomic issues" (Colander et al. 2009: 7 n.; cf. Kirman 2010).   
14 "D[ynamic] S[tochastic] G[eneral] E[quilibrium] models are impeccably microfounded, but their 
micro-foundations are hardly compatible with credit cycles and financial dislocations. [...] Financial 
assets are absent or modelled in a primitive fashion. Their prices assumed to reflect all available in-
formation under the strong version of the efficient market hypothesis. There are no coordination fail-
ures, as rational and forward looking representative agents behave consistently with the model of the 
aggregate economy. Since intertemporal budget constraints always hold, there can be no insolvencies" 
(Spaventa 2009: 3; cf. Goodhart et al. 2013).  
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Thus it becomes clear that aiming for a consistency of individual optimisation and mac-
roeconomic activity creates an unfounded bias towards equilibrium − possibly a high price 
paid for scientific progress. Microfoundation of macroeconomics misleads us to believe that 
economic results on a national or global level should be regarded as the outcome of individual 
choices, and thus for normative reasons do not need any intervention by economic policy. In-
coherence of individual plans, coordination failures, supply or demand side rationing − all 
this cannot easily be reconciled with the methodological concept of New Keynesian theory. 
The paradigm of a rational representative agent "made economics blind with respect to the 
role of interactions and connections between actors" (Colander et al. 2009: 14).  
Reading modern research contributions sometimes provokes the suspicion that scientists 
tend to confuse New Keynesian models with reality. They explore constructed problems of 
surreal worlds with extreme mathematical and econometrical precision (Caballero 2010; 
Faust 2012). It is doubtful whether a rather demanding formal education enables young eco-
nomists to solve practical questions posed within firms and political institutions.15 For many 
observers, modern scientific progress is assessed as useless at best, if not as dangerous (Buiter 
2009). Thus, again, economics appears to be guilty of recent crises. However, three remarks 
can be made to modify this judgement.  
Firstly, one ought to beware of drawing far-reaching consequences from the simple basic 
model of New Keynesian macroeconomics. In recent years, many extensions and enhance-
ments were made that also modify the initial assumption of perfect financial markets and thus 
                                                 
15 "A graduate student in a typical American or European university studying the subject of macro-
economics would be taught that the macroeconomy can be represented by representative consumers 
and firms who continuously optimize a multi-period plan, and in order to do so, use all available in-
formation including the one embedded in the model. These consumers and firms not only perfectly 
understand the complex intricacies of the workings of the economy, they also know the statistical dis-
tributions of all the shocks that can hit the economy. As a result, they can make scientifically founded 
probabilistic statements about all future shocks. In this world of God-like creatures, there is no uncer-
tainty, there is only risk. Coordination failures do not occur because representative agents internalize 
all possible externalities. Bankruptcies of firms and consumers are impossible. Bubbles and crashes 
cannot occur because rational agents using all available information would never allow these to hap-
pen. Prolonged unemployment is impossible except when consumers choose to take more leisure. 
Having mastered the intricacies of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models [...], our brilliant 
new PhD graduate would then start a career teaching this model to the next cohort of PhD students. In 
the process of acquiring supreme skills in solving DSGE models, our PhD graduate would not have 
learned what an investment multiplier is, nor would he have the slightest idea of what the paradox of 
thrift is. Instead, he would have learned that by the law of Ricardian equivalence, government budget 
deficits cannot affect output" (De Grauwe 2010: 157-8).  
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focus issues of financial intermediation (e.g. Gertler/Kiyotaki 2010). This is not the location 
to judge of the prospects of these approaches. But it should be kept in mind that most of the 
mentioned model extensions were suggested after the financial crisis. Thus we cannot pre-
clude that an ivory-tower optimism embedded in the simple New Keynesian model might has 
influenced practical goings-on in the sphere of finance and promoted the belief that systemic 
disturbances are inconceivable.  
In this context, secondly, the links between theory and practice have to be checked more 
closely. It was already mentioned that education along New Keynesian lines hardly yields 
large benefits for economic practice. Students and practitioners often reject "too abstract" 
macro theory; thus it is hardly conceivable that professional young bank managers created 
new financial instruments with an eye on the equilibrium bias of New Keynesian theory. 
Rather the focus should be oriented at the business economics branch of financial market the-
ory. Obviously the implications of new strategies and instruments for the financial market as a 
whole have not been sufficiently scrutinised. Cohorts of best educated young bankers, coming 
from of top US business schools, were unable to see that their "perfect calculated" daily busi-
ness jeopardised liquidity and solvency of their own financial firms.16  
Thirdly, it is an astonishing fact that practical economic policy in no way seemed to be 
influenced by New Keynesian beliefs when designing the necessary response to the world 
wide demand shock that developed after the financial crisis. Many governments showed not 
to be deterred and employed traditional fiscal deficit spending in large doses. Hence the po-
tentially harmful consequences of scientific progress turned out to be rather limited. 
Nevertheless the assessment of the quantitative demand effects of government budget 
deficits remains a much debated issue since then. They are small in the New Keynesian model 
because households are assumed to expect compensating tax increases in the future; thus they 
react by saving more in the present in order to keep their long-term consumption path stable. 
Along these lines of reasoning it makes no difference whether additional government spend-
ing is financed via taxes or new debt ("Ricardian Equivalence").17 If however − in contradic-
tion to the spirit of the model − the existence of unemployed persons is admitted who cannot 
                                                 
16 "The individuals or banks making the decisions were not aware that their increasingly interdepen-
dent positions were generating a threat to the stability of the whole system" (Kirman 2010: 505).  
17 As an aside: both the imputations that governments aim for long-run zero debt (which follows 
from standard decision models with an intertemporal budget constraint) and that private agents rate 
this to be a credible plan, are quite remarkable; they cannot easily be reconciled with empirical evi-
dence. 
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choose their consumption level at will as they are excluded from the labour and the credit 
market, these "non Ricardian" households benefit from government deficit spending because 
a higher level of demand and income ensues. The multiplier effect of deficit spending then is 
higher (European Central Bank 2010; Müller 2012). In the meanwhile scientific policy advis-
ers continue to submit multiplier estimates from models with implicit full employment to non-
informed finance ministers, in order to "support" their decision making on fiscal policy; this is 
a case for an inquiry on part of an Ethic Commission in economics.  
 
5. Have the economists whitewashed the European Monetary Union project?  
 
The crisis of EMU also appears as a financial crisis although it might just as well be denoted 
as a public or balance of payment crisis. Before its outbreak, a case of questionable market 
valuation of assets could be observed. Until 2007, nominal yields of eurozone government 
bonds converged although this contradicted standard results of fundamental risk analysis. It is 
argued that the convergence could be explained by the anticipation of the abolition of the no-
bail-out rule; but as uncertainty with regard to the extent of rescue operations lingers on up to 
the present day, this anticipation can hardly be seen as the result of rational expectations. The 
most convincing argument is derived from ECB refinancing operations where government 
bonds from all EMU countries were accepted as collateral without any haircut so that arbi-
trage provided for interest rate assimilation (Buiter/Sibert 2005).  
 The large and volatile interest rate spreads in later years can easily be explained by the 
temporary indeterminacy of southern countries' bond values. Lacking an implicit nominal re-
funding guarantee of a national central bank, arbitrary assumptions on governmental future 
financial resources might lead to self-fulfilling, multiple equilibria including the threat of a 
rapid default. In this regime, expectations of financial market agents might be rational, but not 
unambiguous: rumours telling that a government might fail to roll-over a tranche of its stock 
of debt in the future, and that an equivalent budget surplus will not be available, will motivate 
present creditors to sell their bonds, which in turn lets interest rate burden increase and might 
lead to insolvency. If on the other hand policymakers convince the public of a solid state of 
government finance, and if fiscal shocks remain of moderate magnitude, bond prices will stay 
stable (De Grauwe 2011).  
 Can we argue that economic theory contributed to the EMU crisis because this instability 
of the government bond market was not well understood or neglected? It is true that during 
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the early planning stage of EMU some German economists explicitly appreciated that na-
tional budget deficits should be financed via capital markets only, and that government should 
have no longer access to central bank facilities; all this was expected to establish a strong 
pressure towards fiscal discipline (Sievert 1993). But already in 1989 the Delors Commission 
had warned that the scope for government finance would fluctuate imponderably in this case; 
hence the problem of instable, and probably procyclical credit supply on bond markets was 
well known.18  
 A second starting point for claiming a guiltiness of economic science might be the pre-
sumption that the single-currency project was recommended by pointing only to the reduction 
of information and transaction costs, a widely shared argument in the public to the present 
day. There is an influential school in economics according to which money is a medium of 
exchange and a medium of account without any "deep" significance; why should trade-inten-
sive economies use different numéraires? However inhabitants of the eurozone quickly learnt 
that a common currency creates very deep relationships, creditor-debtor dependencies in par-
ticular. Hence a pure transaction-cost-saving approach would have been inadequate for under-
standing EMU.  
 Contrary to this traditional scant regard for money however, economists envisaged − after 
the establishment of a common currency − substantial welfare gains for all EMU member 
countries, which were expected to flow from intensified trade and faster development. An in-
tensive scientific debate explored a "new" theory of optimal currency areas that was adapted 
to EMU conditions. The old theory had recommended to exclude countries that are character-
ised by large and asymmetric (relative to union average) demand shocks; in this case ex-
change rate adjustments are necessary for stabilisation. The new approach focuses on the 
topic of development and aims to justify membership also of emerging countries (like Spain, 
Portugal and Greece). The common euro capital market was designed to give these countries 
access to cheap foreign credit that would be used to capital accumulation. The by-product of 
this policy was strong goods demand in the fast growing economies, but the accompanying 
large current account deficits does not, as in the old approach, indicate an urgent stabilisation 
                                                 
18 "Experience suggests that market perceptions do not necessarily provide strong and compelling 
signals and that access to a large capital market may for some time even facilitate the financing of eco-
nomic imbalances. Rather than leading to a gradual adaptation of borrowing costs, market views about 
the creditworthiness of official borrowers tend to change abruptly and result in the closure of access to 
market financing. The constraints imposed by market forces might either be too slow and weak or too 
sudden and disruptive" (Delors Committee 1989: 20). 
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problem but rather the success of the catching-up strategy.19 
 The failure of this policy is obvious. Foreign credit mainly was used for increasing con-
sumption and non-performing real estate investment. Wage increases far beyond productivity 
growth let competitiveness deteriorate, and contagion spilling over from the Lehman Crisis let 
the bubble burst. A sudden stop of foreign investment (like during the Asian crisis of 1997/ 
98) revealed the weak balance of payment position of some countries. Finally government de-
fault could only be prevented by means of bail-out programs and monetary policy interven-
tions that clearly violated the spirit, if not the wording of EMU Treaties.  
Why did economists get it so wrong? Competitiveness of European countries (depending 
on productivity growth, wage formation, and governance quality, i.e. the efficiency and reli-
ability of the political system) shows a slowly diverging pattern since many decades. South-
ern economies that occupy centre stage of the current euro crisis also needed repeated cur-
rency devaluations during the former fixed-exchange-rate era. Yet economists and politicians 
seemed to believe that all these deeply embedded structural differences between European 
countries would vanish after creation of EMU. Revealingly German critics of the EMU pro-
ject mainly focused on the threat of higher average inflation due to an alleged lack of "stabil-
ity culture" within the decision board of the ECB.  
Still in the 2000s, when current account deficits of southern EMU countries increased, 
only few economists spelled out a warning. The majority continued to appreciate the alleged 
course of catching-up even if they could not help to notice that improvements in productivity 
growth remained "surprisingly" low. Fagan/Gaspar (2007), the latter director-general for re-
search at the ECB, and later finance minister in Portugal, thus predicted foreign debt rising to 
200% in simulation exercises − without annotating any stabilisation or default problems!20  
With the benefit of hindsight, this appears as an example of cognitive dissonance. It 
shows the strong belief and stamp of economists when it comes to interpret economic facts 
and processes. As in the New Keynesian model, it is the habit of thinking in terms of in-
tertemporal optimisation that bears the risk of misleading (mostly young) professional scien-
tists in their apprehension of social reality. In the case of the EMU project, the intertemporal 
                                                 
19 Key principles of this concept are to be found in the Delors Report (1989) and in the Report of 
the European Commission "One Market, One Money" (1990). See also Tavlas (1993) and − still with 
an optimistic tone − Mongelli (2008).  
20 It took several years before a balanced analysis of the prospective development of southern euro-
zone countries was published on the part of the ECB (Dieppe et al. 2012). A more detailed treatment 
of this aspect of the EMU story, with a richer reference to the literature, is given in Spahn (2013). 
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approach of the balance of payments, based on a one-good, representative-consumer model 
with dynamic saving and trading decisions (Obstfeld/Rogoff 1996), made economists hope 
that when a country like Greece gets access to easy credit conditions it surely will aim to in-
vest in a productive capital stock.  
 
6. Once again: banking and finance without limit 
 
Admittedly, there is some truth in the view that both the Subprime and the euro crisis devel-
oped from a common origin. This is the banking business, which shows an impressive expan-
sion since the end of the Second World War (Jordà et al. 2013). The steady growth of balance 
sheets, relative to GDP, indicates a deepening of a division of labour between real and finan-
cial sectors of the economy (and within the banking sector), but also a decreasing productivity 
of banking services. One of the long-term driving forces of bank liabilities is a tendency of 
the household saving rate to exceed the economy's growth rate. Whereas in standard growth 
accounting the counterpart item of the rise of money wealth is the growing capital stock in the 
firms sector, in many western societies it is the secular rise of government debt. The parallel 
increase of private money wealth and public debt contributes to ballooning financial stocks in 
world markets − and also should private agents admonish to have a net, instead of a gross 
view on their wealth.  
 The growth of bank assets depends on the emergence of profitable investment projects, 
which then are financed by bank credit. Thus the US and the Spanish real estate bubbles were 
a result of banking activities. Eurozone banks acted as a hub for transferring capital within the 
eurozone (Obstfeld 2013); they accumulated southern countries public bonds because ex-
change rate risk had disappeared (which in turn however increased government default risk 
because it precluded gradual adjustment processes).  
 Finally, the scope for the growth of banking was enormously enlarged by the interplay of 
higher leverage and an elastic liquidity provision on the part of monetary policy. Banks re-
duced liquid-asset holdings and drew large portions of funding from the financial market be-
cause all market members knew that at least some of them, if need be, could use an unre-
stricted access to central bank refinancing. The modern norm of central bank policy, to supply 
base money endogenously in response to revealed market needs, and a high-trust regime on 
the interbank market made for a large, or as some say, excess elasticity of the banking system 
(Shin 2012). Without any quantitative restrictions felt in reserves, bank portfolio strategies are 
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tilted towards expansion: investment activities are enlarged as long as the expected yield gap 
is expected to be positive. Thus waves of financial investments, with ensuing bubbles and 
crashes, starting from the Japanese real estate in the late 1980s, are easily understood.  
The immediate need after a crash, when the interbank market dries up, is to guarantee the 
liquidity of all market agents21, but what can be done in the medium and long run? Econo-
mists seem to have overlooked the systemic risks of overbanking. What is necessary, on the 
one hand, is a massive increase of bank capital in order to insulate asset losses from spillovers 
to the banking sector at large (Admati et al. 2011), and, on the other hand, a reconsideration 
of the endogenous-money principle in the sphere of base-money supply management. Over 
centuries, high-powered money was subject to natural or institutional supply constraints. It is 
true that, in the history of banking, many defaults and bank crises rooted in a lack of liquid-
ity.22 But now we have learnt that the internalisation of unlimited refinancing facilities mis-
leads the banking system to finance one bubble after the other.  
 
7. Summary 
 
Economists can hardly be blamed for economic crises; economic theory in general says that 
crises are unavoidable, or may even be necessary for long-run growth of welfare. But one has 
to concede that the latest vintage of macroeconomic theory, the New Keynesian model, shows 
an equilibrium bias that results from its methodological principle to explain macroeconomic 
outcomes as realisations of a microeconomic optimal-decision framework. There is some 
irony in the fact that it is the progress of economic thought, which causes this drawback; for 
some decades economists aimed to overcome the schism between the micro and macro de-
partments.  
 One might also concede that highbrow macro theory, together with a successful record of 
stabilisation policy, contributed to an intellectual background that spread optimism and en-
couraged risk taking. But surely, there was no direct link from New Keynesian theory to the 
practices of modern banking. Also the ongoing debate on the rationality of asset price move-
ments, and the accompanying claim for a more "psychological" view on financial market 
                                                 
21 "The increasing dependence of the banking system on access to funding from financial markets 
could also mean that central banks are forced to underwrite the entire funding market in times of dis-
tress in order to avoid the collapse of the banking system" (Schularick/Taylor 2010: 11).  
22 See the initial remarks on the gold standard and the Great Depression.  
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agents, does not help much to understand bank defaults and the collapsing interbank market 
after the fall of Lehman. Financial market theory and practice had neglected systemic reper-
cussions of micro bank trading patterns. Myopic bank behaviour shows that agents, if looked 
upon from a bird's eye, do not always behave rationally; but maintaining the rational expecta-
tions assumptions in theoretic modelling might help to improve the education of young pro-
fessional bankers, in order to avert future disaster.  
 The euro crisis emerged from the neglect of undergraduate economic wisdom: adjustment 
mechanisms are needed if heterogeneous economies are linked by trade and capital flows. 
Professional economists also knew that even flexible wage rates in currency union member 
countries are a poor substitute for adjustable exchange rates. It provides evidence of modern 
economists' inclination to think in terms of optimisation procedures that mounting current ac-
count deficits in the eurozone were explained, and thus partly justified, by making reference 
to the approach of the intertemporal balance of payments. Hopes that indebtedness will turn to 
growth and prosperity have been disappointed so far. However, studying the roots of the 
EMU project (James 2012) shows that policymakers, more than economists, are to blame for 
pushing the decision towards the euro.  
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